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ABSTRACT 
Discussion of the future of genetic selection of children often focuses on genetic 
engineering and “designer babies.”  Such technology may never come to fruition.  In this paper, I 
would like to focus on something that is more realistic: preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) 
for complex traits.  PGD has important limitations compared to genetic engineering: the number 
of embryos available to choose from is limited, and the embryos themselves are limited to the 
genetic contributions of the potential parents.  Choosing for complex traits will inevitably force 
some parents utilizing PGD to make trade-offs between one complex trait and another.  This 
paper will introduce PGD as it stands today, and then examine constitutional arguments 
regarding procreative liberty and if they apply to PGD for complex traits.  After discussing some 
of the concerns regarding the current uses of PGD and how it is regulated in different counties, I 
will conclude with a discussion of whether and how PGD for complex traits should be regulated.  
While concluding that PGD for complex traits is not a constitutionally protected fundamental 
right and thus open to significant regulation, I argue that future regulation, at least initially, 
should be limited to ensuring government receives comprehensive data on testing being 
conducted, rigorous informed consent is utilized, and appropriate standards for testing are set. 
INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS? 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) involves in vitro (outside the body) testing of 
embryos or oocytes, historically for various genetic abnormalities, rather than relying on pre-
natal diagnosis and potential abortion.1  First demonstrated in rabbits in 1968, development of in 
vitro fertilization (IVF) and technological advances enabling genetic diagnosis of singe cells led 
                                                 
1 JPM Geraedts & GMWR De Wert, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 76 CLINICAL 
GENETICS, 315, 315 (2009). 
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to the first instance of PGD in the human context in 1989.2  PGD is one step of the assisted 
reproduction process, which begins with stimulation of the ovaries, oocyte retrieval, and then 
fertilization.3  PGD testing is performed on either a polar body4 or a cell or cells removed from 
the embryo at three to five days after fertilization.5  Embryos that are deemed desirable by PGD 
are not necessarily implanted.  Embryos must also be embryologically viable.6  PGD does not 
alter the genetic makeup of an embryo and is thus not genetic engineering.7  PGD only allows 
parents to choose among the genetic variations they were able to produce.8       
Currently, the reasons for utilizing PGD generally falls into one of seven categories: 
monogenic disorders (disorders caused by a defect in a single gene), structural chromosomal 
abnormalities (for example, part of one chromosome being located on a different chromosome), 
aneuploidy (three or one copy of a chromosome rather than two), mitochondrial disorders, stem 
cell transplantation (“savior sibling”) sexing for X-linked disorders (disorders associated with 
genetic defects on the X chromosome that affect males), and sexing for social reasons such as 
family balancing.9  While PGD is not currently utilized for complex traits, in 2009 a fertility 
                                                 
2 Id. 
3 Id.  
4 The polar body is a byproduct of oogenesis, and contains the genetic material of the mother 
only. 
5 Geraedts & De Wert, supra note 1, at 316. 
6 Kathryn Ehrich & Clare Williams, A ‘Healthy Baby’: The Double Imperative of 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 14 HEALTH 41, 50 (2010). 
7 GENETICS & PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS: A DISCUSSION OF 
CHALLENGES, CONCERNS, AND PRELIMINARY POLICY OPTIONS RELATED TO GENETIC TESTING 
OF HUMAN EMBRYOS 4 (2004). 
8 Id. at 3. 
9 Geraedts & De Wert, supra note 1, at 317-20. 
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clinic in Los Angeles began advertising the forthcoming availability of PGD for eye color, hair 
color, and complexion.10  This claim, however, has not yet come to fruition.11 
The most recent data available on the use of PGD is from 2006 in Europe and 2007 in the 
United States.  Data available on the use of PGD in the U.S. is limited.  Data from the CDC 
indicate that PGD was utilized in approximately 5% of the 142,435 Assisted Reproduction 
Technology (ART) cycles performed in 2007, which would equate to approximately 7,000 ART 
cycles utilizing PGD.12  One reference laboratory performing testing on biopsied embryos 
reported 246 instances of PGD for non-therapeutic sex selection between January of 2006 and 
August of 2007.13  This would equate to roughly 148 instances of non-therapeutic sex selection 
per year.  As this is only an unknown fraction of non-therapeutic sex-selection conducted in the 
United States, it appears PGD for this purpose is significantly more common in the United States 
than in Europe, where there were only 82 PGD cycles for social sexing in 2006.14 
                                                 
10 William Saletan, Color ID: Screening embryos for eye, hair, and skin color, SLATE (Fe. 17, 
2009, 8:10 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2211390. 
11 The link advertising hair color, eye color, and complexion selection provided in the above 
article from slate.com currently directs to the clinics “what’s new” page.  There is currently no 
mention on the website of selection of eye color, hair color, or complexion.  See THE 
FERTILITY INSTITUTES, http://www.fertility-docs.com/news_events.phtml?ID=22 (last visited 
November 18, 2010). 
12 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2007 ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 5, 91 
(2009).  An ART cycle is defined as when a woman begins taking drugs to stimulate egg 
production.  Id. at 4. 
13 Pere Colls et al., Preimplantation genetic diagnosis for gender selection in the USA, 19 Sup. 2. 
REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 16, 18 (2009).  The laboratory receives embryo biopsies 
from referring facilities across the country, and the study was based on PGD cycles performed 
for 53 IVF centers. 
14 V Goossens et al., ESHRE PGD Consortium Data Collection IX: Cycles from January to 
December 2006 with pregnancy follow-up to October 2007, 24 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1786, 
1804 (2009). 
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  Data available from Europe is more comprehensive.  In Europe, there were 5,858 PGD 
cycles in 2006.15  Aneuploidy (also known as PGS in Europe) screening is utilized for women 
undergoing IVF in an attempt to identify normal embryos for transfer, and thus increase the 
chances of a successful pregnancy.16  The Genetics and Public Policy Center speculated that 
aneuploidy screening would soon constitute the majority of PGD procedures,17 and in Europe 
this has been the case, where aneuploidy screening accounted for nearly two-thirds of all PGD 
testing in Europe.18  Recent randomized control trials have not shown that aneuploidy screening 
increases the chances of a successful pregnancy and may even reduce live birth rates; the 
American Society of Reproductive Medicine and the British Fertility Society do not support 
aneuploidy screening.19   
In addition to social sexing, the other more controversial types of PGD are also 
performed at very low levels.  In 2006, there were 29 PGD cycles for “savior siblings.”20  There 
were only three cycles of PGD for pre-disposition to breast cancer.21  
There is no guarantee that a PGD cycle will result in the birth of a child.  Success rates 
are currently quite modest.  For example, 2006 data from Europe indicate there were 812 oocyte 
retrieval procedures for chromosomal abnormalities, yielding 11,411 oocytes.22  This yielded 
                                                 
15 Id. at 1788. 
16 Geraedts & De Wert, supra note 1, at 320. 
17 GENETICS & PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, supra note 7, at 3. 
18 V Goossens et al., supra note 14, at 1789. 
19 Geraedts & De Wert, supra note 1, at 320. 
20 Id. at 1791. 
21 Human Reproduction, SupplementaryTable IIIc, 
http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/suppl/2009/04/29/dep059.DC1/Table_IIIC.pdf 
22 Geraedts & De Wert, supra note 1, at 321. 
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5062 biopsied embryos, and 1126 of those were transferable.23  There were 493 embryo transfer 
procedures and 126 deliveries, for an overall delivery rate of 15%.24   
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS: BECAUSE PGD FOR COMPLEX TRAITS IS FAR REMOVED FROM THE 
MORE BASIC DECISION OF WHETHER OR NOT TO PROCREATE, THE SUPREME COURT IS UNLIKELY 
TO IMPOSE HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY ON PGD FOR COMPLEX TRAITS 
 
As use and uses of PGD increase, so too will calls for its regulation in the United States.  
The following section examines whether PGD, in particular PGD of complex traits, may avoid 
heightened constitutional scrutiny.  Proponents of viewing PGD as a fundamental right take a 
broad view of procreative liberty, arguing that where differences in the traits of offspring affect 
the relational experience of parent to child, parents have the right to effectuate those preferences, 
and that the potential harms are too speculative to justify infringing upon procreative liberty.25  
Skeptics point out that there is a total absence of Supreme Court precedent in the area of 
reproductive technologies, and while the Supreme Court would presumably recognize a 
constitutional right to reproduce, and quite possibly the right of infertile couples to utilize 
reproductive technologies, a very expansive reading of Supreme Court precedent is required to 
find a fundamental right to select offspring characteristics.26  I will argue that current Supreme 
Court precedent is unlikely to support a fundamental right to PGD for complex traits.27 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 John A. Robertson, Preconception Gender Selection, 1 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 
2, 6-7 (2001). 
26 Carl H. Coleman, Is There a Constitutional Right to Preconception Sex Selection?, 1 THE 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 27, 27-28 (2001). 
27 Much of the discussion of case law in this section will follow the framework from Dov Fox, 
Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the Egalitarian Ethos, 33 AM. J. L. 
& MED. 567, 574-79 (2007). 
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The Supreme Court has a History of Protecting Basic Decisions Regarding Reproduction. 
 
The history of Supreme Court jurisprudence in regards to procreation begins with a 
rejection of the notion that the right to procreate is a fundamental liberty interest protected by 
due process.28  In a rather abbreviated opinion, the Court upheld a Virginia statute that allowed 
the State to sterilize Carrie Buck, a woman judged “feeble minded.”29  The statute allowed the 
superintendent of state mental institutions to sterilize individuals when he determined it was in 
the best interests of the patient and society.30  In conclusion, Justice Holmes authored the now 
infamous phrase, “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”31  The Court’s attitude toward 
government mandated sterilization made a distinct shift in Skinner v. State of Oklahoma.32  The 
Court struck down Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization act that allowed Oklahoma to 
sterilize individuals convicted of three felonies involving “moral turpitude.”33  The Court 
characterized the statute as one involving “the basic civil rights of man” and fundamental to 
existence.34  While basing its decision on equal protection rather than due process grounds, the 
court concluded any statute giving a state the power to sterilize its citizens must meet strict 
scrutiny.35 
The concept of constitutional protection for procreational privacy begins with Griswold v 
Connecticut.36  Griswold recognized a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the marital 
                                                 
28 Buck v Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 206. 
31 Id. at 207. 
32 Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
33 Id. at 536. 
34 Id. at 541. 
35 Id. 
36 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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home, striking down a Connecticut statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives.37  Perhaps 
significantly for an analysis of a proposed constitutionally protected liberty interest, the Court 
found that while it was not their place to judge the wisdom of laws relating to economics or 
social conditions, “this law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and 
wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation.”38  The Court found decisions 
relating to contraception in the marriage relationship lied in “zones of privacy created by several 
fundamental constitutional guarantees,” ultimately concluding, “[w]ould we allow the police to 
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? 
The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”39 
Procreational privacy was then broadened from the marriage context in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird.40  The Court struck down a Massachusetts law that made dispensing contraception to 
anyone other than married persons a felony.41  In striking down the law on Equal Protection 
grounds, the court recognized that a marital couple is not an entity unto itself, but represents two 
individuals.  Therefore, “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”42 
The year after the Eisenstadt decision, the Court extended the right of privacy and 
personal liberty under the due process clause to a woman’s decision whether or not to have an 
                                                 
37 Id. at 485-86. 
38 Id. at 482. 
39 Id. at 485-86. 
40 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
41 Id. at 454-55. 
42 Id. at 453 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905)). 
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abortion.43  The court found that this right was “not unqualified” and thus adopted a trimester-
based framework to accommodate the State’s interest in the health of the mother and potential 
life.44  The right was then modified in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, removing the trimester 
framework, holding that, prior to viability of the fetus, the State may express a preference for 
childbirth, so long as state regulation does not impose an “undue burden on a woman's ability to 
make this decision.”45  In affirming the essential holding of Roe, the court framed the liberty 
interests protected by due process in broad terms: 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education. … These matters, involving the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept 
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under compulsion of the State.46 
  
If read narrowly, the case-law protects against state interference with specific acts: 
avoiding an unwanted pregnancy, terminating an unwanted pregnancy, and the decision of the 
state that an individual should not reproduce.47  There is a good case to be made, however, that 
the Court would interpret the principles of these cases more broadly.   
In striking down a Texas criminal statute prohibiting sodomy in 2003, the Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas held that “liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how 
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”48  The court justified this broad 
                                                 
43  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) 
44 Id. at 154, 163-64. 
45 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
46 Id. at 851. 
47 Fox, supra note 26, at 577. 
48 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003). 
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language specifically by referring to Casey and the language quoted above.49  Similarly, the 
Court may interpret liberty to give protection to individuals in “deciding how to conduct their 
private lives” in matters pertaining to procreation.50  But even if interpreted broadly, would the 
Court realistically find a fundamental liberty interest in PGD for complex traits?  It is important 
to note that while the statute in Lawrence was struck down, a fundamental right triggering 
heightened scrutiny was not announced, as the statute did not further any legitimate state 
interest.51  While it may be likely that the Supreme Court would interpret due process to give 
individuals “the freedom to decide whether or not to have offspring and to control the use of 
one's reproductive capacity”52 expecting the Supreme Court to deem PGD for complex traits 
constitutionally protected may be a field too far. 
The argument focuses on the Casey protection for “choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy.”53  Proponents argue there is a broad concept of procreative liberty allowing 
individuals almost complete autonomy of their reproductive capacity.54  This broad reading for 
procreative liberty is justified by “parental interest in self-expression in matters of reproductive 
selection and design.”55  The choice to reproduce or not is central to one’s sense of self, and if the 
choice to reproduce is a fundamental right, then pre-birth control over offspring characteristics 
should follow from that.56  This follows, it is argued, because individuals seek or avoid 
                                                 
49 Id. at 559, 574. 
50 Fox, supra note 26, at 577. 
51 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
52 JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 16 (1994). 
53 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
54 Fox, supra note 26, at 578. 
55 Id.  
56 John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 425-
27 (1996). 
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reproduction because of the experience it will provide.57  “If a couple would not reproduce if a 
child had gene A but would if it had gene B, procreative liberty should protect their decision not 
to reproduce in the first case and to reproduce in the second. Denying them information about A 
or B, or denying them the ability to make reproductive choices based on that information, will 
interfere with their procreative liberty."58 
Because of the Deep Split Within the Supreme Court Regarding How Fundamental Rights 
Should be Defined, it is Unlikely the Court Would Expand Procreational Privacy Far Enough to 
Include PGD for Complex Traits. 
 
It seems unlikely the Supreme Court would frame the issue quite so broadly.  When 
examining this question, one must think about the disagreement within the court on how 
fundamental rights are identified, and their boundaries determined.  The case of Michael H. v. 
Gerald D. is illustrative.59 
Michael H. had an affair with Victoria, a married woman, who subsequently gave birth to 
a child that blood tests showed a 98% probability Michael was the child’s father, and Michael 
had an ongoing relationship with the child.  When Michael was no longer allowed to see the 
child, he filed a filiation action in California to establish paternity and visitation rights.  
California law, however, stated that – unless important or sterile – a husband cohabitating with 
his wife is the presumptive father of any child, and that presumption could only be rebutted by 
the mother or the husband.60  The court upheld the statute, a plurality of the court finding the 
                                                 
57 Id. at 427. 
58 Id. 
59 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) 
60 Id. at 113-15. 
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interest present was not a fundamental right rooted in the traditions and conscience of the 
nation.61   
Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia framed the issue as “whether the relationship 
between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has been treated as a protected family 
unit under the historic practices of our society.”62  Framed in this fashion, Justice Scalia found no 
support for the power of a natural father to assert parental rights to a child born into a woman’s 
marriage with another man.63  In a footnote joined only by the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia 
outlined his method for identifying fundamental rights: examining the rights historically afforded 
an adulterous natural father with respect to the marital family was the correct inquiry, rather than 
dissent’s inquiry into protection afforded to parenthood generally, because he argued there was 
no basis for that level of generality.  Examining the rights afforded adulterous natural fathers, on 
the other hand, was the most specific level at which a tradition is found, and protection was 
clearly denied historically.64  Allowing judges to choose the level of generality to assess a right, 
argued Justice Scalia, “leav[es] judges free to decide as they think best” and “a rule of law that 
binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule at all.”65 
Writing in dissent, Justice Brennan questioned Justice Scalia’s assertion that tradition 
could yield definitive contours to liberty, arguing that tradition was an equally “malleable and 
elusive” concept with no objective means to define it.66  The plurality chose not to focus on the 
protection parenthood has historically received by the courts because it was too clear for 
                                                 
61 See id. at 124. 
62 Id. 
63 Indeed, Justice Scalia found quite the opposite.  Id. at 124-26. 
64 Id. at 127, n. 6. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 137 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
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dispute.67  Justice Brennan argues that drilling down to the specific variety of parenthood ignored 
precedent: cases such as Eisenstadt and Griswold would have reached different results under this 
method of analysis.68  Further, Justice Brennan argued that there was good reason to limit the use 
of tradition in interpreting the “deliberately capacious” language of due process.69  By requiring 
specific approval from history and focusing on whether an interest has been traditionally 
protected “rather than one that society traditionally has thought important (with or without 
protecting it),” substantive due process is reduced to protecting the already protected, making 
due process a redundancy.70 
In contrast to Michael H, the Court in Lawrence did not frame the constitutional question 
nearly so narrowly.  The Court explicitly rejected the framing of the issue advanced in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, a previous case involving a criminal statute prohibiting sodomy, where the issue was 
stated as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to 
engage in sodomy.”71  The majority concluded this framing of the issue “demeans the claim” and 
instead focused on the statutes “more far reaching consequences, touching upon the most private 
human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”72 
And so the debate rages on, with no particular agreement on the methodology to identify 
fundamental rights and their scope.  How would the court define procreative liberty?  Certainly 
the affirmative decision to have a child would seem to fall under the rubric of choices “central to 
personal dignity and autonomy” of Casey, but how would the Court define its outer boundaries?  
Following Justice Scalia’s mode of analysis from Michael H would suggest a rather narrow 
                                                 
67 Id. at 139. 
68 Id. at 139-40. 
69 Id. at 140. 
70 Id. 
71 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986)). 
72 Id. at 567. 
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boundary.  There is arguably no deeply rooted historical tradition of ART since it simply is so 
recent.  Given this fact, following Justice Scalia’s analysis would likely limit procreative liberty 
to coital reproduction.  This arguably illustrates some of the shortcomings of Scalia’s analysis 
elucidated by Justice Brennan.  ART has been with us for thirty years, PGD for twenty.  At what 
point do they become sufficiently rooted in our history to become traditions relevant to liberty?  
Fifty years?  200 years?  That decision seems to hand judges as least as much discretion as 
choosing the level of generality that an issue is framed.  Such a strictly defined definition of 
procreative liberty would give the State the power to consign couples with a high risk of 
conceiving a child doomed to early death because of a genetic disorder with the option to either 
forgo reproduction or choose prenatal diagnosis and abortion of the affected fetus.  
Constitutional protection to abort an affected fetus with simultaneous denial of constitutional 
protection to choose an unaffected embryo would seem extremely anomalous. 
On the other side of the coin, a constitutional right to select an embryo based on whatever 
criteria one desires seems equally untenable.  This takes the procreative decision outside of 
something central to autonomy to something perhaps quite trivial.  Given the limited number of 
embryos from which to choose, limited by the genetic material of the progenitors, PGD for 
complex traits will inevitably involve tradeoffs.  Should a parent who wants to maximize a 
child’s intelligence choose the embryo with the greatest odds for superior academic achievement, 
even though that same embryo harbors an increased risk for heart disease compared to other 
embryos?  What about if the parent was most interested in hair color, or skin tone?  The decision 
to have a child is fundamentally different from preferring certain characteristics for that child.  
New technologies should not be enshrined in the constitution and subject law addressing it to 
heightened judicial scrutiny simply because they relate to procreation.  The State should have the 
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authority to take a precautionary approach if it so desires.  When facing a new technology, 
potential harms to individuals or society is necessarily speculative, and the State may decide the 
risks rational enough to impose limits before the speculated harm materializes.  Expanding 
procreative liberty in such drastic fashion would certainly give credence to Justice Scalia’s 
criticism that allowing judges to determine the correct prism of generality gives them too much 
authority to impose their own preferences. 
Professor John Roberts, using the example of PGD for perfect pitch, argues that selection 
of embryos should be allowed for such a purpose if the couple can demonstrate it is of great 
importance: 
Ultimately, the judgment of triviality or importance of the choice within a 
broad spectrum rests with the couple. If they have a strong enough preference 
to seek PGD for this purpose and that preference rationally relates to 
understandable reproductive goals, then they have demonstrated its great 
importance to them. Only in cases unsupported by a reasonable explanation of 
the need—for example, perhaps creating embryos to pick eye or hair colour, 
should a person’s individual assessment of the importance of creating 
embryos be condemned or rejected.73 
 
While this may be a fine policy argument, as Justice Scalia might say, “this is not the 
stuff of which fundamental rights … are made.”74  It would not be possible to hinge the extent of 
procreative liberty based on each individual’s personal preferences on equal protection grounds.  
Therefore, if it’s feasible that a couple could demonstrate a strong preference related to 
reproductive goals for a particular trait, PGD for that trait would be constitutionally protected, a 
reading of procreative liberty that strikes the author as seriously overbroad and that a swing vote 
on the Court would be unlikely to adopt.  For example, in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy focused on 
                                                 
73 John A. Robertson, Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Medical and Non-Medical 
Uses, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 213, 215 (2002). 
74 Micheal H., 491 U.S. at 127.  I do not mean to imply that professor Roberts is making a 
constitutional argument in the cited article.  His argument is an ethical one. 
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the fact that the case did not involve minors or formal government recognition of homosexual 
relationships: in short, “[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.”  PGD, on 
the other hand, involves the testing and selection of embryos that, if implanted successfully, the 
State has a legitimate interest in from the outset of the pregnancy.75  Six years prior to Lawrence, 
the Court declined the opportunity to give an expansive reading to personal autonomy, upholding 
a Washington law banning assisted suicide.76  The majority specifically rejected the respondents 
reliance on Casey: “[t]hat many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause 
sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all 
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”77  Given the State’s immediate 
interest in the product of PGD, it seems unlikely that a swing vote on the Court would find 
regulation of PGD for complex traits subject to heightened scrutiny.     
It seems most likely that, as is the case with abortion, the Court would strike an uneasy 
middle ground.  The Court may protect as a fundamental a right of access to PGD that has a real 
and undeniable effect on the decision to procreate: PGD for genetic disorders that result in early 
death or severe disability.  Parents at significant risk of conceiving a child consigned to an early 
death or severe disability face a true constraint on their ability to procreate: accept the likelihood 
of conceiving and perhaps aborting a child that is doomed or simply choose not to conceive.  
This offers the benefit of a relatively bright line.78  PGD for complex traits, however, is unlikely 
to effect the fundamental decision of whether to procreate or not, and the Court should not 
subject laws regulating it to heightened scrutiny.  The number of individuals who would forgo 
                                                 
75 Casey, 505 U.S. 846. 
76 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997). 
77 Id. at 727. 
78 There would, of course, likely be significant disagreement on the margins of what is 
sufficiently severe, and what death sufficiently early. 
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having a child because they could not, for example, choose an embryo more likely to have high 
academic achievement, is likely vanishingly small to non-existent.  This flexibility allows States 
to be responsive to legitimate concerns of a technology whose effects are unknown. 
Another avenue for asserting a fundamental right to PGD for complex traits would be by 
analogy to the “right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of 
their children.”79  The Court has characterized this right as “perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”80  The argument, then, is if parents have 
extensive freedom to shape their children through how they rear them, what is the difference 
between shaping them through decisions about their child’s genetics?81  Childhood influences 
can ingrain characteristics in a child while they are too young to contest it, and in that sense are 
no less permanent than selected genetic characteristics.82 
Analogy to the Right of Parents to the Care, Custody, and Control of Their Children is 
Unpersuasive Because it Gives the Embryo the Same Status as the Child. 
 
Regardless of the merits of the analogy, it appears to contain a significant flaw that 
renders the analogy a nullity: under the above reasoning, an embryo is given the same status as a 
living, breathing child.  Once the embryo is given the same status as a child, the logic of the 
whole system clearly breaks down.  If the parent’s interest in control of the child extends to the 
embryo, then by the same analogy the State’s own compelling interest in preservation of the 
child’s life should extend to each and every embryo.  At this point, the state could ban ART 
entirely and still pass strict scrutiny.  Alternatively, if the embryos are considered merely 
property, then the process of PGD is reduced to nothing more than an economic transaction, 
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something the Supreme Court long ago got out of the business of applying heightened scrutiny 
to.83  Another alternative argument could be that the parents have a heightened interest while the 
State does not due to the parents’ exercise of their procreational rights to control the embryo just 
as they control the resulting child.  But now the argument has come full circle: it is substantively 
no different than the previously discussed argument regarding reproductive autonomy.  
While PGD for complex traits would undoubtedly be a highly complex, personal, and 
individualized decision, this does not automatically grant that decision protection as a due 
process liberty interest.  Even considering the court’s more expansive reading of liberty in 
Lawrence, the context of that case and the Court’s general reluctance to grant sweeping  
protected liberty interests ultimately indicate that constitutional protection for PGD is unlikely to 
extend to complex traits. 
CURRENT CONTROVERSIAL USES OF PGD: SOCIAL SEXING AND HEREDITARY BREAST AND 
OVARIAN CANCER 
 
This section discusses two of the more controversial aspects of PGD: social sexing and 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer (HBOC).  Concerns surrounding both of these techniques 
are relevant to a discussion of PGD for complex traits.  Social sexing is the first example of 
using PGD for selection relating to non-disease genes.  PGD for HBOC identifies embryos at 
markedly increased risk for cancer, but the cancer does not develop until adulthood, if it 
develops at all. 
Social Sexing Raises Concerns About Reinforcing Sexism and Genetic Control of Offspring that 
Supporters Contend are Overblown or too Speculative. 
 
Arguments against social sexing can be separated into four categories: increasing sexism, 
societal sex-ratio imbalances, the welfare of children expected to act in conformance with their 
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gender, and sliding further down the slope of genetic control of offspring.84  Those concerned 
with the propensity for sex selection to lead to sexism state that history shows that gender 
selection has promoted and reinforced discrimination against females.85  Pre-conception sex 
selection, then, can be seen as unjust because it could serve to perpetuate gender discrimination, 
allowing parents to use gender as a measure of a child’s worth.86  These concerns are particularly 
heightened when selecting the sex of a first-born child, as opposed to family balancing.87  
Closely related to arguments regarding sexism is that as a consequence of sexism in 
preconception gender selection, sex-ratio imbalances could result.88  For example, new 
technologies enabling selective abortion of female fetuses have exacerbated already present sex-
ratio imbalances in countries such as China, South Korea, and India.89 
 Another concern is that sex selection could affect the welfare of children where selection 
is purely for social reasons.  Helping people have a particular kind of child is very different from 
helping people conceive generally.90  Whether it is for diversity or selection of the gender of a 
first-born child to obtain a specific rearing experience, sex selection could have the capacity to 
reduce children to something more akin to products.91  It would follow from this assertion that 
parents would then potentially be less willing to accept the shortcomings of their children.92  This 
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could undercut the child’s self-esteem, which children may blame on their parents, and undercut 
family ties.93   
Concerns about child-welfare, then, are fundamentally intertwined with concerns over 
greater genetic control of offspring.  Sex selection moves society ever closer to genetically 
engineered offspring, and those already committed to ART are the ones most likely to take 
advantage of this technology since it can be added relatively cheaply.94  This self-selected pool, 
already committed to pre-birth control of their offspring, may be at the greatest risk for a poor 
outcome if sex selection fails.95  Parents less tolerant of shortcomings in their own children due 
to pre-birth selection may also have less compassion for the handicapped.96  Sexism issues are 
also woven into the fabric of concerns about genetic enhancement.  Being male confers 
advantages in our male-dominated society, and allowing parents to select a first-born male child 
inevitably allows some parents fulfill a vision of genetic enhancement.97  In essence, the 
argument is that sex selection already puts society well down the proverbial slippery slope.98  
Therefore a better understanding of where this technology could take us is necessary before 
proceeding.99 
Supporters of sex selection note that there is a difference between concluding a particular 
person’s choice of sex selection is unethical and deciding all such decisions should be 
circumscribed.100  Males and females are different, and it is not inherently sexist to seek variety 
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in the rearing experience or prefer one experience to the other.101  It is difficult to imagine any 
detectable demographic effect on sex ratios in the United States.102  Research appears to support 
this conclusion that sex selection, in the aggregate, has not favored males over females.103  
Logically, it would seem that if male embryos are not preferred, fears over sexism should be 
assuaged.  However, even if males are not preferred overall in sex selection in the United States, 
there is evidence males are preferred by certain ethnic groups.104  Still, regulation of sex selection 
is unlikely to have any impact on controlling gender discrimination generally, and is a less 
harmful proposition than abortion.105 
Arguments concerning the welfare of children ignore potential benefits and focus on 
harms that are highly speculative.  Tangible benefits of sex selection include not exacerbating 
overpopulation problems by forcing parents to “try again” to have a child of the desired gender, 
and the corresponding ease in the economic burdens of providing for a large family.106  In cases 
where a child of a certain gender is desired for discriminatory reasons, sex selection could 
prevent the psychological suffering of a child of the unwanted gender.107  From a different 
perspective, prohibiting sex selection inherently cannot serve the best interests of the child 
because even if a female child was born where the parents desired a male, the resulting child 
can’t be worse off than she should have been otherwise, because without the attempt at sex 
selection, the parents would have conceived a different child.108 
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Proponents of sex selection heavily emphasize the vital interest of personal autonomy and 
procreative liberty, arguing that personal satisfaction is an important moral consideration.109  Sex 
selection is just one example of reproductive technology allowing parents to rear children with 
the qualities they value, be it health of otherwise.110  People are motivated to have children by the 
personal satisfaction associated with being a parent: they are in the best position to evaluate what 
sort of rearing experience they want, and parents choosing their child’s gender may be more 
likely to nurture that child well, increasing child welfare on the whole.111  Prohibiting sex 
selection has an inherent conflict with a woman’s rights concerning her reproductive choices: if a 
woman can choose to abort due to the gender of the fetus, it makes little sense to prevent her 
from exercising that same choice before the pregnancy even begins.112  Procreative liberty should 
not be impinged merely because of theoretical harms that may or may not come to fruition.113  
“Allowing people to live their lives by their own lights and even to make some bad or even 
unethical decisions is inherent in our valuing liberty.  A demonstration of actual overriding 
harms is the only legitimate justification for constraining liberty.”114 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
avoidance of psychological harms to unwanted children would be obviated.  The 
psychological consequences to that particular child would not affect the best interests of that 
child, because if the parents chose sex selection the child would not have been born, and 
presumably the child is better off having been born, even if her life is not as good as if she had 
been a male child.  This represents a difference is perspective: the welfare of the particular 
child, or the welfare of children as a whole from the perspective of society. 
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PGD for HBOC Elicits Concerns Over Testing For Traits that Have no Effect on Offspring as 
Children, While Supporters Regard Age of Onset as Irrelevant. 
 
PGD for HBOC raises its own concerns.  The large majority of hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancer is associated with mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, giving rise to an 
estimated 50% to 80% lifetime risk of breast and ovarian cancer.115  HBOC accounts for less than 
10% of all cases of breast and ovarian cancer.116  Ethical analysis of PGD for HBOC requires a 
balancing act: are the burdens on parents and children of carrying susceptibility genes great 
enough to justify the burdens of PGD to screen out affected embryos.   
Skeptics point out that unlike other applications of PGD, where screening is for 
conditions causing death or severe disability in early childhood, PGD for HBOC screens for 
mutations that have no affect on the pregnancy, or on the offspring as children.117  Treatments, 
from earlier and more aggressive screening, to chemoprevention or prophylactic surgery, are 
available to reduce the risk to a carrier.118  If an individual is diagnosed with cancer, their quality 
of life both before and after diagnosis can be good.119  Unlike sex selection, because there is no 
outward difference in the child ultimately produced, PGD for HBOC would not impact the day-
to-day rearing experience of parents.  PGD is costly, often failing to result in pregnancy.  These 
realities justify at least caution, and taking measures to ensure adequate counseling of those 
considering PGD for HBOC without pressure to choose in favor of screening.120 
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Proponents argue that age of onset is irrelevant.121  There simply is no good time to be 
afflicted by a genetic condition or any principled way to distinguish what age of onset should be 
deemed sufficiently serious.122  Parents have a strong interest in having healthy children.123  In 
families where most to all female members are affected, the fear of cancer is extreme, and 
prophylactic removal of the breasts or ovaries have significant physical and emotional costs.124  
None of the preventive measures listed above eliminates the risk of HBOC and research indicates 
parents have an interest in and a sense of responsibility for avoiding long-term health 
consequences for their children.125  Given that these mutations are a major source of suffering for 
generations of families, that disease occurs later in life is not morally significant; the creation and 
destruction of embryos to eliminate the risk of HBOC is therefore far from frivolous.126 
EXISTING REGULATION: REGULATION OF PGD RUNS THE GAMUT FROM TOTAL BANS TO THE 
ABSENCE OF ANY DIRECT REGULATION 
 
Given the controversial nature of PGD, PGD is heavily regulated or banned in a number 
of countries.  There are four general systems of regulation of PGD: constitutional or statutory 
bans, licensing and regulation through statute, regulation limited to professional organizations, 
and no regulation.127   
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Germany has been described as the “quintessential example of restrictive regulation.128  
Embryos are given the right to life at the time of fusion of the sperm and the egg under both the 
German Constitution and statute.129  The ban is based upon human dignity, and the concept that 
no one should be disadvantaged by a handicap.130  Other reasons behind the ban not expressed by 
statute include the eugenics of the Nazi regime and concern that children born as a result of 
parents’ preferences may be accepted not for their own sake, but for the preferences chosen.131  
Support for the ban is certainly not unanimous, as surveys have indicated support for some PGD 
procedures among the German public132 and one of two parliamentary ethics committees favored 
allowing PGD.133  A limited variation of PGD does exist in Germany.  Under the law, an embryo 
is created after the fusion of the maternal and paternal nuclei, twenty-four hours after 
insemination.134  This allows genetic testing in this timeframe by biopsy of the polar body, 
allowing for testing of the maternal genotype.135  This practice has its own ethical problems.136  
Consequently, treatment is not viewed in Germany as being worthwhile, and while formal 
referral is not allowed, patients subsequently go abroad.137   
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Presumed bans or tight restrictions on PGD in other European counties have recently 
been successfully challenged.  In Ireland, PGD was presumed to be banned because the Irish 
Constitution protects the right to life of the unborn.138  The question of whether or not an embryo 
is an “unborn” under the Irish Constitution was addressed in the case of Roche v Roche, where 
the court determined that the term “unborn” in the Irish Constitution does not include un-
implanted embryos.139  This would appear to open the door for PGD to take place in Ireland.  In 
Italy, PGD was only allowed to determine if an embryo had a genetic disease if “serious and 
actual danger for the physical and mental health of the woman” was shown.140  Italian courts 
have since opted for a less restrictive reading of Italian law, and held that performing PGD when 
there is a risk of serious genetic disease is acceptable.141 
The United Kingdom (UK) is probably the most well known system of comprehensive 
regulation of PGD by government.  Performing PGD requires licensure from the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act of 1990.142  Clinics must apply for a license for each new condition and new test they plan to 
perform, and providing false information to obtain a license is a crime punishable by 
imprisonment.143  The HFEA Code of Practice allows testing of an embryo for three primary 
reasons: 
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(a) establishing whether the embryo has a gene, chromosome or mitochondrial 
abnormality that may affect its capacity to result in a live birth, 
(b) in a case where there is a particular risk that the embryo may have any gene, 
chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality, establishing whether it has that 
abnormality or any other gene, chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality, 
(c) in a case where there is a particular risk that any resulting child will have or 
develop –  
(i) a gender-related serious physical or mental disability,  
(ii) a gender-related serious illness, or 
(iii) any other gender-related serious medical condition, establishing the sex of 
the embryo 
*** 
(2) A licence... cannot authorise the testing of embryos for the purpose mentioned in 
sub-paragraph (1)(b) unless the Authority is satisfied– 
(a) in relation to the abnormality of which there is a particular risk, and 
(b) in relation to any other abnormality for which testing is to be authorised under 
sub-paragraph (1)(b), that there is a significant risk that a person with the 
abnormality will have or develop a serious physical or mental disability, a serious 
illness or any other serious medical condition.144  
 
Licensing is thus fairly limited in scope: “social sexing” is not allowed, and the creation 
of “savior siblings” is subject to strict criteria.  However, the number of conditions licensed by 
HFEA has grown significantly in the past few years.  In 2007, the number of conditions licensed 
for PGD was over fifty.145  Currently more than 150 conditions are licensed for PGD by the 
HFEA, including testing for hereditary cancer syndromes.146  Some clinics feel that the 
bureaucracy of the HFEA causes delays that negatively impact patients, while another notes that 
applications are not turned down, rendering regulation superficial.147  Other European countries, 
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such as France and The Netherlands, have similar highly regulated, centralized licensing 
schemes.148 
Other European counties have more liberal regulation of PGD.  Spain, for example, 
universally allows PGD to select embryos that are histocompatible with siblings in need of a 
bone marrow transplant, i.e., the creations of “savior siblings.”149  Belgium, meanwhile, has no 
specific regulation of PGD, although regulation in other fields serves to prohibit social sexing.150  
Not surprisingly, Spain and Belgium are among the leaders in the number of foreign citizens 
receiving PGD services within their respective borders.151 
  In Japan, two professional organizations, the Japan Society of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, and the Japan Society of Fertility and Sterility regulate PGD.152  Their regulations 
only allow PGD, including sex selection, in the case of severe hereditary disorders.153  A dearth 
of consequences for violating guidelines can make it difficult for professional organizations to 
deter violations.154 
The United States has not imposed any kind of formal regulation of PGD at this time.155  
This, in turn, makes more controversial forms of PGD more widely available, although, as noted 
earlier, there is paucity of data available for the United States.  In Europe, it is very uncommon 
for a center performing PGD to engage in social sexing: a survey of fertility centers in Europe 
found only one center indicating it performed PGD for social sexing.156  In the United States, one 
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laboratory alone performed PGD for social sexing 246 times in less than two years.157  The 
relatively wide availability of PGD uninhibited by regulation in the United States leads to 
Europeans utilizing the United States for PGD services.  For example, a British couple was able 
to have PGD for selection of a savior sibling in the United States after being rejected by the 
HFEA.158 
REGULATING PGD FOR COMPLEX TRAITS: BECAUSE CONCERNS REGARDING PGD FOR COMPLEX 
TRAITS ARE LARGELY HYPOTHETICAL, REGULATION SHOULD FOCUS ON ENHANCING 
PROCREATIVE LIBERTY  
 
Given the current lack of regulation in the United States, how, or if, PGD will be 
regulated in the future as the traits that can be tested for increase in number and complexity is an 
open question.  Technology will not suddenly allow one day for “designer babies,” if it is even 
possible at all.  PGD for complex traits will develop along a continuum, with different traits or 
disease risks being developed with varying degrees of predictive ability.  For example, testing 
might be able to give relatively accurate information on an embryo’s predisposition towards type 
II diabetes: three to six times the average population risk, depending on various environmental 
factors.  On the other end of the spectrum, maybe genetic testing on an embryo could show a 
predisposition towards anti-social behavior, but testing is unable to show more than a 20% 
increase in risk.  Currently, genome-wide association studies have identified a myriad of genetic 
risk markers for a range of chronic diseases, but most are associated with small increases in 
risk.159  Future studies may identify rarer genetic variants that have larger effects,160 but, in its 
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infancy, PGD for complex traits may involve relatively low predictive value.  This is further 
complicated by how our genomes interact with our environment.  For example, polymorphisms 
that are associated with disease in one environment can be protective in another.161  Parents 
opting for PGD of complex traits would in most instances be choosing probabilities, rather than 
certainties.  PGD for complex traits will tend to enhance some of the ethical and societal 
concerns identified previously for sex selection and HBOC.  The following section examines 
how limited choice of embryos, the probabilistic nature of testing, and the subsequent trade-offs 
parents may be forced to make (should we select for height, or musical ability?) affect this 
analysis.   
While Legitimate, Concerns Regarding PGD for Complex Traits are Highly Speculative, and, 
Without More, Do not Justify the Infringement on Reproductive Autonomy. 
 
There may be greater concerns for psychological distress in offspring.  Taking the 
example of parents selecting an embryo for greater musical ability, parents may excessively push 
the resulting child towards music, or be disappointed in their child if she does not show a 
predilection towards music, resulting in psychological distress for the child.  “Having the way 
she is raised unduly affected by her parents’ expectations consequent on their PGD decisions” 
could unduly restrict her “open future.”162  As discussed earlier, this is inconsequential to best 
interests of the child analysis, since the child is presumably better off having been selected and 
consequently born.  Limiting the analysis to the best interest of the child, though, would be 
myopic.  From the perspective of society, the welfare of children generally is certainly of 
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consequence: if PGD for complex traits produced psychological distress in children that on the 
whole reduced the welfare of those children, this would be an important consideration.  
However, any hypothesized reduction in welfare is highly speculative.  First, to assess the true 
negative consequences of PGD, one would need a measure of not only the effects of parental 
pressure on children chosen by PGD, but also pressure on children not a product of PGD.  If a set 
of parents were sufficiently motivated to have a child with a high level of musical ability that 
they would choose the time and expense of PGD to achieve that goal, it seems likely that these 
parents would also exert a significant amount of pressure on any child to pursue music.  It is not 
at all clear how much greater the pressure on a child of PGD would be, if at all.  Balanced 
against the speculatively negative side of the equation must be the positive value to the welfare 
of children who, chosen for their predisposition for musical ability, do in fact share that interest, 
leading to a more fulfilling rearing experience.  The extent of this positive side of the equation is 
also speculative.  Such an unknown balance of harms and benefits is a weak argument for 
restricting access to PGD for complex traits. 
Perhaps more persuasive are potential psychological consequences to parents who must 
make tradeoffs when choosing between embryos.  For example, say a couple choosing PGD has 
two concerns: they desire a child predisposed to a high level of musical ability, and there is a 
family history of neural tube defects (NTDs).163  The two best embryos have divergent 
characteristics: one has a lower probability of developing an NTD, but the genetic background 
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does not show any particular predisposition towards musical ability; the other is three times as 
likely as the typical child to have high musical ability, but without a genetic background evincing 
protection against NTDs.  Despite the family history of NTDs, the couple feels the absolute 
chances of having a child with an NTD are still low, and choose the embryo predisposed to 
musical ability.  The child is born with spina bifida.  What is the psychological effect on parents 
like this, who chose to take a risk and roll snake-eyes?  When parents have to choose between 
different embryos predisposed towards different traits, parents may feel guilty or cheated having 
selected for one trait over another, only to not have the trait selected for realized.  Of course it is 
also entirely speculative how often this sort of harm would occur, and its balance against the 
benefits to parents.  These concerns may speak well to the idea of rigorous informed consent so 
individuals may pursue their reproductive autonomy in an informed manner, but are again a 
tenuous reason to restrict PGD. 
Related to concerns over sexism in sex selection are concerns that PGD for complex traits 
could lead to discrimination against those with disabilities, or make it “more difficult to convince 
the successful to adopt a charitable moral posture toward those who are less fortunate.”164  These 
concerns are also blunted by the practical realities of PGD for complex traits, at least in its early 
stages.  PGD will simply be unable to select “perfect” children.  Even assuming scientific 
advances in embryo creation, the number of viable embryos to choose from will be limited, and 
the genetic content of the embryo is limited by the genetic diversity of the sperm and egg that 
created it.  Prospective parents utilizing PGD for complex traits will face difficult decisions 
about what are, and are not, their priorities: musical ability or protection against high cholesterol; 
predisposed to above average height or analytical ability?  Parents likewise will not be able to 
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eliminate all risks for disability.  PGD cannot select an embryo guaranteed not to suffer a birth 
defect, because such an embryo simply does not exist.  The genetic and environmental factors 
are simply too complex.  Parents utilizing PGD will still have children with birth defects and 
other disabilities.  It is possible that parents utilizing PGD, having faced the difficult choice of 
which embryo to implant, are more susceptible to having a charitable moral posture since they 
would have a very personal understanding of the limits of PGD and how much remains beyond 
their control.  The largest impact of PGD on disabilities for the foreseeable future will be those 
caused by single gene disorders, which is a world we already inhabit.  Given the availability of 
abortion, the impact of PGD on attitudes towards these disabilities is arguably negligible.  In a 
world that comes up short of genetic engineering, concerns about discrimination against the 
disabled and more dismissive attitude towards the less fortunate are significantly blunted. 
    Related to these concerns are those of social inequality.  Is it right to allow those with 
resources to utilize PGD to increase the welfare of their children while others are unable to 
access these services?  The question in response, is how would those without access be helped by 
a ban on PGD for complex traits?165  If we tolerate inequality in access to PGD for single gene 
disorders because of their effect on well-being (disease makes our lives worse), then selection of 
embryos for resistance to chronic disease or non-disease traits such as musical ability should be 
justifiable insofar as they have a positive effect on well-being.166  In short, “Of the possible 
children they could have, couples should have the opportunity to have the child whose life will 
be best.”167 
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Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, arguments against genetic enhancement assert 
it takes us from “thick” to “think” humanity:  
Genetic enhancement pushes us … to a thinner view of ourselves: as bundled 
preferences that are identifiable, separable units, to be appraised, priced, 
purchased, traded in and upgraded. Genetic enhancement shifts us towards a 
mode of valuing our internal selves that is most associated with the appraisal 
of commodities in the marketplace. In so doing, we have more freedom to 
define ourselves, and yet the givenness, internality, and wholeness that 
sanctified this pursuit have vanished.168  
 
PGD for complex traits may have the opposite affect.  The inherent limits of limited number of 
embryos with limited variation and the resultant difficult choices it would yield could serve to 
emphasize our internal selves by starkly illustrating the limitations on how much we can shape 
our children by choosing embryos.  While couples will strive to make their children’s lives 
better, their children will still ultimately define themselves. 
The likely arguments against PGD for complex traits are based largely on speculated 
harms, most of which are made less likely by the inherent limitations of PGD.  Balanced against 
this are arguments for procreative liberty that, while not constitutionally persuasive, should give 
us serious pause before imposing restrictions on PGD.  A woman who makes the decision to go 
through arduous IVF procedures to have the child she wants has made an intensely personal 
decision.  Uncertain harms should not be the basis of decisions society has learned it is best not 
to interfere with.169 
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169 Savulescu, supra note 108, at 18. 
 35 
Regulations can Help Enhance Procreative Liberty Through Reporting Requirements, Rigorous 
Informed Consent, Standards for Testing, and Encouraging Research. 
 
While harsh regulation based on uncertain harms is unwise, regulation should have an 
important place in PGD for complex traits.  As PGD for complex traits is introduced in the 
future, regulation can serve to enhance procreative liberty by protecting patients.  To imagine 
some of the risks to procreative liberty inherent in unregulated PGD, one can look to current 
direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing. 
Companies such as 23andMe and Navigenics offer to analyze individuals’ genomes and 
inform customers of their genetic risk for a wide variety of health conditions.170  There currently 
is little to no federal regulation of these tests.171  Recently, the Government Accountability Office 
had five donors send their DNA samples to four different companies.172  Results were wildly 
inconsistent across the board: one individual’s results stated that–depending on which companies 
results were consulted–he was at average, below average, or above average risk for prostate 
cancer and hypertension.173  Of the fifteen conditions examined in the report, companies 
provided contradictory results for between nine and twelve conditions.174  These differences 
occur because the companies rely on published studies to choose which markers to analyze, and 
                                                 
170 See Navigenics – Health Conditions We Offer, NAVIGENCS.COM 
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different companies choose to rely on different studies and different genetic markers.175  One 
company even provided differing predictions within their own results.176  Some companies also 
made unrealistic claims, such as asserting children’s DNA could be analyzed to determine which 
sports they would be good at.177 
If the above practices were seen in PGD for complex traits, reproductive freedom would 
be curtailed without some sort of regulation.  As PGD for complex traits debuts, embryos will be 
identified for selection based on probabilities of displaying a certain trait, and the probability 
could be relatively low or disputed.  There would be obvious temptation on the part of providers 
to oversell the predictive powers of their testing.  Prospective parents could be faced with a vast 
array of confusing contradictions.  Looking at the same information, one PGD service may insist 
embryo A is the most predisposed for high intelligence and general good health, while another 
declares embryo B is the best choice, and because they base their testing on newer, better studies, 
they know embryo A actually shows an increased risk for heart disease.  If PGD follows the 
same unregulated, standardless path of DTC genetic testing, procreative liberty could be 
inhibited by the resulting confusion of competing tests of uncertain validity.   
To facilitate procreative liberty, regulation in this area must attempt to strike a balance 
between flexibility to adapt to rapidly developing technology but still ensure potential parents are 
well informed and not being sold the proverbial bill of goods.  This goal could be served by a 
two-pronged approach.  First, implement legislative requirements providing for rigorous data 
reporting and informed consent.  Requirements for data reporting can allow government officials 
and the public to monitor the field and intervene if it is headed in a direction deemed undesirable.  
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Logical requirements for data reporting would include the number cycles of PGD, the number of 
pregnancies that result, the traits being selected for or against, and, perhaps most importantly, the 
clinical basis of testing.  For each embryo and each trait being tested for, what markers are being 
used, and what methods are utilized to calculate the odds of a desired trait?  Armed with this 
information, government can give the public a full picture of what is being tested for, who is 
doing the testing, and inform the public about its judgment of the clinical validity of the testing 
being offered.  Equally important will be rigorous informed consent requirements, both before 
the process beings and before an embryo is selected, so potential parents have a firm grasp of 
what PGD for a complex trait will and will not be able to accomplish.  To facilitate consent, 
clinics should be required to utilize genetic counselors or other genetics professionals when 
obtaining consent.  Prior to beginning the IVF process, potential parents should be informed of 
the inherent limitations of PGD previously discussed of limited embryos to select from, limited 
to the genetic material they contribute.  Parents should also be informed of the clinical validity of 
the trait(s) they are requesting testing for, and the that the nature of a probabilistic test means that 
their child may not display the trait desired.  After testing has been conducted on embryos, 
parents should be informed of results for each embryo tested so parents may weigh their options 
if multiple traits are being considered, or weigh the chances of achieving a successful pregnancy 
because of the quality of the embryo with the varying odds for different embryos to show the 
desired trait. 
The second prong should involve setting standards for testing of traits, so clinics utilize a 
consistent set of markers and potential parents avoid inconsistent information depending on what 
clinic they choose.  Because testing would likely be a rapidly evolving field, these standards 
would most appropriately be set by a professional organization rather than a government agency.  
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A professional organization would have the ability to bring experts together and more rapidly 
make changes to standards for testing as new information became available.  The drawback of 
this approach would be that these standards would not have the force of law.  One way to 
encourage compliance with these standards is to tie them to the data-reporting requirements.  
Clinics following the standards of the professional organization could simply indicate that they 
were doing so, and avoid the time and expense of explicitly laying out their own testing 
regimes.178  Of course, even standards set by a relatively flexible professional organization would 
likely slow the development of testing.  This seems like a reasonable cost, however, of ensuring 
PGD for complex traits proceeds in an orderly fashion that does not take advantage of potential 
parents. 
Finally, government should encourage research.  The data reporting requirements 
discussed earlier are a first step.  Another is requiring facilities offering PGD to allow academic 
researchers the access needed to recruit those seeking PGD services into approved research 
studies.  From psychological costs to parents and children, to broader societal concerns of 
attitudes towards the disabled or less fortunate, PGD for complex traits does raise concerns that, 
while hypothetical, should be investigated.  Assessing these concerns is likely to be highly 
challenging social and epidemiological research that could last generations.  The research should 
begin now.  As discussed earlier, PGD for sex and familial cancer raises concerns that are also 
reflected by PGD for complex traits.  If thorough research on these families starts now, concerns 
that are now hypothetical could be substantiated or alleviated by the time PGD for complex traits 
becomes a practical reality. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Long before genetic engineering of offspring becomes possible, if it ever does, PGD for 
complex traits will gradually come into existence.  As the traits that can be selected for or against 
before birth increase, there will inevitably be calls to heavily limit or regulate this technology.  
 An examination of Supreme Court precedent reveals that it is unlikely that the court 
would expand procreative liberty to include PGD for complex traits.  While not constitutionally 
protected, concepts of procreative liberty counsel caution in limiting PGD in the name of 
hypothetical consequences.  That some would inevitably use PGD in ways most would find 
morally objectionable does not mean that it should be eliminated.  The most appropriate role for 
government is to ensure adequate information is collected to inform the public and policymakers, 
and to ensure PGD actually serves to enhance procreative liberty, rather than inhibit it. 
 
 
